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Management of Ethno-Cultural Diversity in Turkey:
Europeanization of Domestic Politics and New Challenges

PROF. DR. AYHAN KAYA∗

Turkey has gone through an enormous process of change in the last
decade, especially regarding the political recognition of ethno-cultural and
religiously diverse groups. The term “diversity” has become one of the catch
words of contemporary political philosophy. Diversity, in its recent forms,
whether cultural, political, ethnic, or religious, is a byproduct of globalization.
Globalization has made the movements of persons or groups in the ethnoscape
easier. It is apparent that the management of diversity has posed a great
challenge for nation states as well as for the international and supranational
organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union (EU).
This paper touches upon the management of ethnic diversity in both
national and supranational levels, with particular reference to Turkey and the
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EU. The thesis makes a distinction between “diversity as a phenomenon” and
“diversity as a discourse/ideology” in the Turkish context. The paper claims
that the state and various ethnic groups in Turkey have been inclined to
employ the “diversity as a discourse/ideology” in the aftermath of the EU
Helsinki Summit of 1999, in compliance with the prevailing discourse of
“unity in diversity” within the EU circles.
Political Philosophy of Diversity: “Unity-In-Diversity”, “Unity-OverDiversity”, and “Together-In-Difference”
There are several recent political philosophers who have tried to
provide some conceptual and philosophical tools in order to lay out a
framework around discussions on diversity. For instance, Will Kymlicka, a
liberal-communitarian, attempts to combine ideas of liberal democratic
principles as a basis for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition
of communitarian rights for cultural minorities (diversity) within the
multinational states (Unity-in-diversity).1 Kymlicka claims that collective
rights for minority groups do not contradict liberal notions of politics. Rather,
they are pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the
minority group in question.2
On the other hand, Brian Barry, a liberal, warns his readers about the
cleavages springing from a multiculturalist approach on the basis that “respect
for diversity” is expected to threaten unity, which he argues is necessary for
promoting equal distribution among citizens.3 This is not wholly an economic
issue, but also one of distributing equal rights. Barry points to the negative
consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on ‘group rights’ when it comes to
sectarian religious groups.4 He argues that such groups could never be
granted group specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal
of impartiality and neutrality. Barry’s priorities lie at the rule of the majority
with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-centered
multiculturalism - in other words, a kind of unity-over-diversity.

1

Kymlicka, Will. MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2
Id. at 46.
3
Barry, Brian. CULTURE AND EQUALITY. AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
4
Id. at 165.
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However, Iris Marion Young, a communitarian, questions this “unity”
as a necessary ground for a modern pluralistic society.5 Instead, she promotes
a “politics of difference,” which aims at recognizing cultural and social
differentiation among people in a region. The people, then, do not necessarily
need to share the same basic ideals; rather, they ought to focus on reaching
agreements and coalitions for solving political problems.6 In contrast to
notions of segregation and even ideals of assimilative integration, Young
postulates a principle of togetherness-in-difference.7
The positions stated above: liberal-communitarian, liberal, and
communitarian, are the most debated political postures with regard to the
management of cultural diversities in the context of nation-states. However,
there is not sufficient discussion concerning the management of cultural,
ethnic, national, religious and civilizational diversity within the European
Union. There have been some recent attempts within the European Union
Commission that aim at possible scenarios for the future. These scenarios
have lately become visible with the circulation of such notions as “unity-indiversity,” “‘Europe of regions,” “cultural diversity,” “diversity,” and
“European citizenship.” It should also be stated here that the EU Commission
seems to favor a Kymlickan “unity-in-diversity” position in order to manage
all sorts of diversities.
Diversity as a Phenomenon, and as a Discourse in Turkey: An Ethnically
Diverse Land
There are two alternative ways of comprehending the notion of
diversity in the Turkish context as well as in other contexts: diversity as a
phenomenon, and diversity as an ideology. The former refers to the
coexistence of different groups in a historical process, which comes into play
either as a primordial phenomenon as in migration flows through Asia Minor,
or as a politically generated phenomenon as in the settlement of various ethnic
groups in Central Anatolia by the Imperial (19th Century) and the Republican
(20th Century) settlement laws. However, diversity as a phenomenon is not
necessarily embraced by ruling powers; sometimes it is denied outright.

5

Young, Iris Marion. A Critique of Integration as the Remedy for Segregation,
in D. Bell and A. Haddour (eds.), City Visions (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000),
205-218.
6
Id. at 216–217.
7
Id. at 206.
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The nation-building process in Turkey, starting from the beginning of
the 20th century, has gone hand in hand with attempts to homogenize the
nation by denying the diverse character of the Anatolian geography. This
process is characterized by a kind of heterophobia, resulting from a fear of
losing the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the
French Revolution. Contemporary Turkish history is the history of
homogenization as in many other examples of nation-building. Hence,
diversity as a phenomenon has so far been denied in Turkey by the political
elite.
Nevertheless, there are recent signs of recognition of ethnic, religious
and cultural differences by the Turkish state. Thus, diversity as a
discourse/ideology is gaining momentum in the last few years, distinguished
by social and governmental attempts to join the European Union. At first
glance, it seems that the shift from the “nationalist homogenisation discourse”
to “diversity discourse” results from external factors such as the EU itself.
But, a comprehensive analysis of the issue may prompt us to reach another
conclusion: that is, the alliance of internal and external factors. In what
follows, the discursive shift from homogenisation to diversity will be briefly
displayed with the interplay of both internal and external dynamics in the
background.
Turkey: A Multi-Ethnic Country
Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, hosting
approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups, some
of which are Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds,
Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians,
and others. However, leaving aside the last decade of democratization
attempts, the Turkish state has been far from recognizing the ethnically and
culturally diverse nature of Turkish society since the foundation of the
Republic in 1923.
Ethnic groups in Turkey have been subject to homogenizing state
policies, some of which originate from the nationalist Turkish history of 1932,
which placed Turks at the center of world civilization. Additionally, the Sun
Language Theory (1936) addressing the Turkish language as the mother of all
languages in the world, unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i
Tedrisat Kanunu, 1924), banning the use of mother tongue and of ethnic
minority names, discriminatory settlement policies (Đskân Kanunu, 1934) visà-vis exchange populations and new migrants; discriminatory citizenship laws
granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim origin migrants, implementing a
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Wealth Tax in 1942, particularly to non-Muslims, and internally displaced
people of the east and southeast of Turkey.8
Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds,
Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis, and Arabs have developed various
political participation strategies vis-a-vis the legal and political structure and
limitations. While the Turkish Republic was being formed in the 1920s, and
especially in the 30s, the republican political elite were highly engaged in a
strong ideology of majority nationalism, which promoted the formation of an
ethnically and culturally homogenous nation. Most of the ethnic groups, then,
preferred to incorporate themselves into this nation-state project along with
the discourse of a homogenous Turkish nation defined by the republican elite.
They abstained from declaring their ethnic identities in public, and thus
considered themselves as one of the constitutive elements of the Turkish
Republic. The defining distinctiveness of the early periods of the Republic
was the Turkification policies,9 which imposed the dominance of Turkishness
and Sunni Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, from the
language spoken in the public spaces to citizenship, national education, trade,
personnel regimes of public enterprises, industrial life and even settlement
laws.
Having an Imperial legacy, many of these new regulations and laws
referred to a set of attempts to homogenize the entire nation without any
tolerance for diversity and difference. It is highly probable that the
underestimation of ethnic diversity among the Muslim population of the
Republic was because of the preceding Ottoman Millet system borrowed by
the republican political elite. As known, the Millet system of the Ottoman
Empire was blinded to ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims
regardless of their other differences belonged to the one and same “Muslim
nation.”10
These kinds of assimilationist and/or exclusionist state policies
eventually shaped the ways in which ethnic groups have developed their
8

For a detailed account of those regulations and laws see Aktar, A., VARLIK
VERGISI VE ´TÜRKLEŞTIRME´ POLITIKALARI, Istanbul: Đletişim Yayınları (2000); Bali,
R., CUMHURIYET YILLARINDA TÜRKIYE YAHUDILERI: BIR TÜRKLEŞTIRME SERÜVENI
(1923-1945), Istanbul: Iletişim Yayinlari (1999); and Yıldız, A., NE MUTLU TÜRKÜM
DIYEBILENE: TÜRK ULUSAL KIMLIĞININ ETMO-SEKÜLER SINIRLARI (1919-1938),
Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları (2001).
9
For further information on Turkification policies see Aktar (2000).
10
‘Muslim nation’ included only the Sunnis, but not the Alevi population in
Turkey.
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identities and political participation strategies. In order to survive in Anatolia,
former generations of ethnic groups preferred to assimilate with mainstream
political culture in Turkey, which was dominated by homogeneity, Sunni
Islam and Turkishness. The work of Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, a Jewish Turkish
nationalist, is illustrative in the sense that he pointed out the main
incorporation strategies for non-Turkish ethnic minorities into the political
system. He proposed ten “commandments” to the Turkish-Jews for their
incorporation with the Turkish nation in the nation-building process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Turkify your names;
Speak Turkish;
Pray in Turkish in synagogues;
Turkify your schools;
Send your children to Turkish schools;
Get engaged in national issues;
Stick together with Turks;
Affiliate yourself with the community spirit;
Fulfil your duties in the national economy;
Be aware of your rights.11

Although, Tekinalp’s commandments may, at first glance, seem to
apply only to non-Muslims in Turkey, there is also strong evidence that his
commandments may also apply to some Muslim communities, such as the
Kurds and Circassians.12
Although Tekinalp’s commandments may sound extreme, there is no
doubt that several ethnic groups have suffered from obscurity, misrecognition,
discrimination, uneven political representation and structural outsiderism.
The dominant discourse of homogeneity has been challenged by a few major
incidents having both internal and external sources:
a) rising politics of identity originating from the USA in the 1970s;
b) Kurdish nationalism, starting in the early 1980s;
c) Alevi revivalism, gaining momentum in the 1990s; and
d) the democratization process, stimulated by the Helsinki Summit in
1999, declaring Turkey as a candidate country to the EU.
There also may be several other minor reasons in this respect. But,
there is one reason worthwhile explaining: Turkey’s enthusiastic hopes and
11

Landau, Jacob M. TEKINALP: BIR TÜRK YURTSEVERI (1883-1961). Istanbul:
Đletişim Yayınları (1996).
12
See, Yıldız, supra at note 8.
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efforts to integrate with the EU in accord with the Helsinki Summit. The
post-Helsinki period corresponds to Turkey’s willingness to go through
certain constitutional and legal changes. These changes also have an impact
on the discourse developed by various ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in
the country. Therefore, the discursive shift from homogenization to diversity
owes a lot to the Helsinki Summit decisions and to the democratization
process which accelerated in the aftermath of the Summit. The following
section will elaborate on the Post-Helsinki process, which resulted in the
intensification of the notion of “diversity as an discourse/ideology.”
THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD: A MODEST TURN TOWARDS
DEMOCRATIZATION
Despite political, ethnic and religious predicaments in neighboring
countries, Turkey has experienced one of the most stable periods in the
history of the Republic. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999,
European heads of state for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect
of full membership of the EU. This occurred more than four decades after
Turkey’s application for association with the European Economic
Community, in July 1959. The decision taken in Helsinki was in almost
directly opposed to that taken at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which was
designed to crush Turkey’s hopes for EU membership. In the aftermath of the
Luxembourg Summit, the public response in Turkey was immediate and
harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalism(s), kemalism, religiosity,
occidentalism and euroscepticism all reached their peaks. But, thanks to the
Helsinki Summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long.
The EU perspective delivered to Turkey in Helsinki owed much to the
letter sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the German chancellor, Gerhard
Schröder, in May 1999. The letter was crucial because in it Turkey expressed
its willingness to undertake structural reforms in political, social and
economic spheres in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. These
commitments were optimistically interpreted by the political elite of EU
member states, and particularly by the German Green Party and the Social
Democratic Party. The letter was sent in the immediate aftermath of the arrest
of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in January 1999. As one can imagine,
the capture of Abdullah Öcalan was regarded as the end of a traumatic reign
of terror and violence, both for the political establishment and the nation in
general.
It is apparent that many ethnic minority groups in western Europe
have recently been trying to bypass their host nation states, to which they
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have been subjected, by bringing their grievances to EU bodies for
resolution. For example, Basques, Corsicans and Catalans have taken their
demands on a transnational basis into the European Commission. Likewise,
Kurds, Alevis, Circassians and other ethnic minorities in Turkey are also
engaged in similar political manoeuvres. In fact, they have rational reasons to
do so.
The EU has recently declined the use of the minority discourse due to
the escalation of minority problems in Europe, especially in the aftermath of
the dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia. As could be clearly seen in
the Accession Partnership Document, which maps out the requirements of
Turkey in the integration process into the EU, the term “minority” has been
replaced with the term “cultural diversity” in order to celebrate “unity in
diversity.” Corresponding to some threats as well as to practical needs within
the western European context, the discursive shift from “minority” to
“cultural diversity” also has its reasons peculiar to the Turkish context in
which the use of the term “minority” carries the risk of provoking certain
groups in one way or another.
Parallel with the discursive shift from “minority discourse” to ‘cultural
diversity,” the rising currency of the understanding of the “Europe of Regions” has
also made an impact on the management of political, economic and social disparities
with regard to less-developed regions. Many Kurds, for instance, are attracted by the
notion of a “Europe of Regions,” capable of providing the context for political
accommodation between the Turkish Republic and the Kurds.13 Similarly, other
ethnic and/or religious groups such as the Alevis, Circassians, Georgians and Lazis
are also captivated by the democratic quality of the EU, which denounces cultural
homogeneity and celebrates cultural diversity. Consequently, ethnic group
associations in Turkey have already abandoned minority politics in the face of the
currently changing political discourse in the West.
There is stong evidence in Turkey that some political actors within the state
apparatus have demonstrated their willingness toward recognizing ethnic, cultural and
religious diversity; and that minority claims are no longer predominantly considered
to be a threat to national security, but to be a quest for justice by at least a part of the
political and military establishment. This shift in the ways in which the state
perceives minority claims has brought about essential repercussions in the public and
the state bureaucracy. For instance, the Minorities Commission, which was secretly
13

Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in
Turkey,” NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS, Vol. 7, No. 3 (August 2001): 1-24.
See also, Ekinci, Tarık Ziya. AVRUPA BIRLIĞI’NDE AZINLIKLARIN KORUNMASI
SORUNU, TÜRKIYE VE KÜRTLER. Istanbul: Sümer Yayıncılık (2001).
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formed in 1962, was banned in 2004 and replaced with the Civil Committee on
Minorities. The new Committee is composed of central and local government
representatives, but does not include any military personnel. This discursive shift is
also visible in the discourse of the Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Interior
Minister and the Chief Negotiator for the Accession Talks with the EU.

Virtuous Circle
The EU perspective offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the
political establishment in Turkey, opening up new prospects for various
ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists,
Circassians, Armenians and a number of religious and ethnic groups in
Turkey have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars
of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The EU provides
great incentives and motivation for numerous groups in Turkey to reinforce
their willingness to coexist in harmony. What lies beneath this willingness no
longer seems to be the retrospective past, full of ideological and political
disagreements among various groups, but rather the prospective future, in
which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are embraced in a democratic
way. The EU currently appears to be the major catalyst in accelerating the
process of democratisation in Turkey.
The conclusions of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen
in December 2002 states that “if, in December 2004, the European Council,
on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides
that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey ‘without delay’.”
However, the political establishments and the general publics in each EU
country are aware of the fact that Turkey’s membership in the Union will
further stimulate discussions about “European identity” and “the limits of
Europe.”
There have been recent heated public debates on Turkey’s EU
membership in several countries, mostly disfavoring membership of a large
state like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socioeconomic conditions below the European average.14 Some arguments point
out the socio-economic disparity between Turkey and the EU, some underline
the Islamic character of Turkey, and some emphasize Turkey’s undemocratic
14

Kubicek, Paul. “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and
Opportunities,” WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. 168, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 67-78.
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and patrimonial political culture, whilst others even raise the clash of
civilizations in order to reject Turkish membership.
Nobody can deny the fact that it will be difficult for the EU to absorb
Turkey in the short term. However, a more constructive discourse needs to be
generated with regard to Turkey’s full membership in order to revitalize one
of the fundamental tenets of the EU, that of “a peace project.” There is no
doubt that a peace project requires constructive rather than destructive
criticism. The discourse developed by the Independent Commission on
Turkey is constructive, and thus deserving of praise.
The decision taken by the Union on 17 December 2004, and
reconfirmed on 3 October 2005, to start accession talks with Turkey
immediately, has also reinforced the Turkish public’s faith in the EU. What is
even more important in Turkey is that “the peace project” discourse has
become quite popular and political. One comes across articles in the
newspapers and speeches on TV and radio that address the EU as a peace
project that has been able to settle the deep-rooted animosity between
Germany and France and, more recently, between Germany and Poland. It is
believed that the EU is not only a peace-making political union, but also one
that exports peace.
The 1999 Helsinki Summit decision prompted a great stream of
reform in Turkey. In fact, the country underwent more reform in just over
two years than during the whole of the previous decade. Several laws were
immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen
political criteria. These included the right to broadcast in one’s mother
tongue; freedom of association; the limitation of military impact on the
judiciary; more civilian control over the military; bringing extra-budgetary
funds to which the military had access within the general budget of the
Defence Ministry; removing military members from the High Audio Visual
Board (RTÜK) and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK); removing military
judges from the State Security Courts (DGM) and eventually the abolition of
those Courts; the extension of civil rights to officially recognized minorities
(Armenians, Jews and Greeks); reformation of the Penal Code; the abolition
of the death penalty; release of political prisoners; the abolition of torture by
the security forces; and greater protection for the press. Furthermore, strict
anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced along with
the International Monetary Fund directives; institutional transparency and
liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority
nationalism have been precluded; and socio-economic disparities between
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regions have also been dealt with. However, much remains to be done and to
be implemented.
The EU perspective has also provided the Turkish public with an
opportunity to come to terms with its own past, a Turkish
“Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (coming to terms with the past). Two widely
debated and polemical conferences on the “Ottoman Armenians during the
Demise of the Empire” and the “Kurdish Question” were organized at the
Istanbul Bilgi University, on September 25-26 2005 and March 11-12 2006
respectively, a point to which we shall return later. Although the judiciary
acted favorably towards the lawsuits claimed by some ultra-nationalist
lawyers, both conferences paved the way for public discussion of two subjects
that had hitherto been taboo in contemporary Turkish history.
Another international conference was hosted (26-27 May 2005) by
the Istanbul Bilgi University’s Centre for Migration Research, on the theme of
the emigration of Assyrians who were forced to leave Eastern Anatolia in the
aftermath of the foundation of the Republic in 1920s. Assyrian-origin
participants from various European countries including Sweden, Germany,
France and Belgium openly expressed their excitement at seeing the radical
democratic transformation that Turkey had recently gone through. Another
conference, on the theme “Meeting in Istanbul: Past and Present,” held June
30 – July 2, 2006, was organized by the Greek-origin minority in Istanbul, to
bring together intellectuals from the Anatolian-Greek diaspora and the Greeks
of Istanbul. Apart from the fact that such conferences could be organized in
contemporary Turkey without encountering any major public intervention, the
latter conference was even hosted by the AKP-affiliated Istanbul Metropolitan
Municipality. All of these legal and political changes bear witness to the
transformation of Turkey regarding its position vis-à-vis the notion of
diversity. This transformation corresponds to a discursive shift, which
officially recognizes Turkey as a multicultural country. That is to say that
multiculturalism is no longer just a phenomenon in Turkey: it is also an
officially recognized legal and political fact.
Vicious Circle
From 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005, when EU state and
national government leaders decided to start negotiations with Turkey,
tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, statist, pro-status-quo
groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. This was the
time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was
replaced with the vicious cycle starting from the late 2005. A new nationalist
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wave embraced the country, especially among middle-class and upper middleclass groups. The electoral cycle of presidential and general elections,
witnessed militarist, nationalist and Eurosceptic aspirations coupled with
rising violence and terror in the country.
The fight between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the
other statist political parties, backed by the army, crystallized during the
presidential election in May 2007. The AKP had nominated the then Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, as presidential candidate, but Mr. Gül did
not fit the expectations of Turkey’s traditional political and military
establishment and he failed to reach the required two-thirds majority in the
assembly sitting. This failure resulted from the fact that the presidential post
has a rather symbolic importance in Turkey since it was first occupied by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. However, the
establishment argued that, as someone with pro-Islamist values and a wife
who wears a headscarf, Mr. Gül was inappropriate for the office of president.
The conflict even led to military intervention in politics on 27th April 2007, an
intervention notoriously labelled “e-intervention” because of the way it was
announced on the web page of the Chief of Staff. However, the nationalist
and militarist alliance against the AKP was unsuccessful in the general
election and on 22 July 2007 the party won a landslide victory, with 47 % of
the votes cast. Following the elections, Abdullah Gül was also elected to the
Presidential office.
It could simply be concluded that, instead of heeding the nationalist
and militarist electoral campaigns, based on a parochial, local, anti-global and
anti-European discourse that aimed for “nationalist closure,” the Turks opted
for Europeanization, globalization, stability and progress. However, this time
the EU was not in a state of being a light house for Turkey again. This is
why, the political divide present at the top of the Turkish State is now being
turned into a social divide between moderate Islamists and secular
fundamentalists, involving a wide variety of political and non-political actors
such as the political parties, parliament, judiciary, army, academia, nongovernmental organizations, media and business circles.
The social and political divide in Turkey has both internal and
external sources. The divide actually seems to have economic reasons as the
ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has so far represented
the interests of newly emerging middle class groups with rural origins and
conservative backgrounds, who are competing against the established middle
and upper middle classes with urban backgrounds. The divide also springs
from the fact that the legitimate political center is now accessible to several
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social groups, including not only laicists, republicans, Kemalists and liberal
business circles, but also Muslims, Kurds, conservative business circles and
several other groups. International sources of the divide are namely internal
crisis of the European Union, enlargement fatigue of the Union, ongoing
instability in the Middle East, changing American interests in the region, the
rise of political Islam as a reaction to the ongoing Islamophobia in the world,
and the global evocative ascendancy of civilizationist/culturalist/religious
discourse.
Conclusion
In the post-Helsinki period, the government has essentially given up
exclusionist nationalist policies and has become rather inclined toward
inclusionary policies vis-à-vis ethnic and religious groups. The Helsinki
Summit essentially refers to the acknowledgment of the notion of “diversity
as an ideology.” Furthermore, the Helsinki decision was very decisive in
turning the Kurdish minority and other ethnic groups into being more
collaborative with the Turkish political system, and in making ethnic groups
raise their concerns to the EU delegation in search for democratization in
many respects. These are the signs in Turkey that some political actors within
the state apparatus have demonstrated their willingness to recognize ethnic,
cultural and religious diversity; and that ethnic groups in general have gone
through a discursive shift from “minority discourse” to “diversity discourse.”
Some of the state actors and several ethnic groups have also implicitly and
explicitly expressed their approval of the Kymlickan position of “unity-indiversity.”
Thus, there seems to be a direct link between the discursive shifts of the
European Union and those of Turkey. Nevertheless, I should point out that, in
this paper I have specifically discussed the Kymlickan position with respect to
both Turkey and the EU. The two other positions by Brian Barry and Iris
Marion Young are also worthwhile to discuss in a greater depth as they both
correspond to some other fault lines in the Turkish context as well as in other
cases, such as the central and eastern European candidate countries.

